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vs. 




J'.l!N W. MAUGIAN and GLADEAN MAUGlAN, 
Tfiird-Partv Defendants-Resondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANJ' 
F?:J/3 
Case No,~ 
STA'l'EMENl' OF THE NA..."'URE OF 'll!E CASE 
Plaintiff brought suit to reoover arrounts owed for materials suoplied and 
1~li'j'?recl to two oonstruction projects of t.1-ie City of Monticello, fltah. 
-"'f,ondant S & '! Insurance Canpanv, had !)reviously issued material payment bonds 
··, insure ?avment to oersons supplying material or performing labor. 'T'hird-oartv 
'.0 ' 0n~ant Tohn r.;. \taug'ian d/b/ a Jonoo Construction ComPany w;;s generfil 
T11tnctor and has been adjudicated ;;s bankruPt. 
DISPOSITION IN 'IHE LOWER COURl' 
Defendant S & H Insurance filed a Motion for SU!l'lllary Judgment which was 
''.ontAi on Mav 17, 1983, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell presiding. A Motion to 
'e·msHer Order Granting SU!l'lllary ,Judgment was filed and denied. 
RELIEF SOUG!T ON APPl"AL 
~fip ,\JJpellant seeks to have this Court reverse the lower oourt decision 
granting Summarv ,Judgment in favor of the respondent, and re.'Tland t'ie r:ase ~'le'. , 
the lower oourt for diSPOsition at trial, or in the alternative to reverse 'ln" 
remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor of olaintiff. 
ST'ATIMF.NI' OF "l!E FACT'S 
In February, 1981, S & H Insurance Comoanv, through its Utah ag,ont, 
Leavitt Group-Bond Division, issued material payment bonds to insur,o oavment t
0 
persons performing labor and supplving material on two ronstruction projects wi:· 
the City of "lonticello, San Juan County, Utah, on which the general oontractor 
was Jonro Construction Ccrnpanv, Inc. Payment Bond #BDB105ll3 was issue'] to r:oJ'io: 
the trunk sewer Pipeline 1xoject, and Payment Bond #'3D13105137 was issued to m·o: 
the outfall sewer and irrigation project. At the request of ,1onro r.Dnstructi'Yi 
C'..anpany, Geneva Pipe Company oerfonned labor and SUJJ?lied materials on the'='"-' 
ronstruction orojects, having a total value of S222,282.18. 
In July, September and October, 1981, Geneva Pioe O:rnoany recei'lecl frCJT ' 
Jonro r..onstruction Company, three l)ayrnents totalling SlOS,000.00, which were 
applied to the City of "lonticello orojects, which were rovered bv the s & H 
Insurance C'..anpany materials payment bonds. In June, lq81, Geneva Pipe r..arn:ian-1 
received a check in the amount of S45,000.00 from ,Jonro Construction Canoanv, 
upon which there was no designation of a job or invoice and the check was aooL0 ' 
on the general acrount of Jonro Construction O:rnpanv. In 'lovernber, lgRl, 
APpe llan t received a check from Jonro Construct ion Company in the amun t 0f 
$7 ,500.00 uoon which there was no invoice or job name ano the check was aopli0 ; 
on the general acrount of Jonro Construction Ccrnoanv. 
Geneva Pipe Campany has stated in affidavits by its 1xesi-:lent that 3t •· 
time before, or after, receipt of the $45,000.00 and $7 ,500.00 c'iecks ~i'! 10~0: 
Construction r,crnpany rontact Geneva Pipe C',anpany stating theri> had f'ieen a 
-2- l 
11 js,wo1 i ,~~t i<•n of the checks. As a matter of fact, there were no instructions 
,,,e1 ;c?d i•·; Gene,;a Pipe Comoany fran Maughn, ,Jonm Construction eanpany or any of 
"""'t~ ')r emoloyees as to the aoplication of the $45,000.00 and $7 ,500.00 
•£neva Pipe Company's president also stated that beginning in 1975, Jonoo 
"cn:'rr1ctio'1 opened an acmunt with Geneva Pipe Company. It had been the 
'.)[ )ctioo for a period of four vears to make nayments on the open acoount and 
"'..~rebv reduce the last balance. At no time during that first four vears of 
ousiness relationship did Mr. Maughn or Jonm Construction Canpany ever direct 
oa\'!11ent 0f dlecks to particular jobs or invoices. In 1979, Jonm r:onstruction 
::rnoany mnverted to a a::rnouterized billing/payment system. Bill pavments were 
intemi ttentlv sent to Geneva Pipe Comoany. Sane of these nayments were for 
1esiqnated invoices or jobs, and others were left without anv indication of an 
,n'l0ice or job name. Fran 1979 until Jonm Construction Cor!pany's termination of 
:1siness, after filing bankruptcy, it was the nractice of Geneva Pipe to make 
ioolication of mecks received without a job description or invoice number to the 
:ast ':>alance on the general acoount. ,Jonoo Construction Company had been aware, 
lnd had accepted this practice for over two years. 
POINr I 
DEFENDANI' S & H INSURANCE COMPA."lY IS REX)UIRED AS A MA'CTER 
OF U\W TO MAKE PAYMENT' TO GENEVA PIPE COMPA_"lY OF SUM.S DTJE 
GENEVA PIPE COMPANY FOR MATERIALS FURNISHSD TO PIOJEC!'S 
FOR wnrn ~m D'E:F'l'MJANI' SUREl'Y PID!IDED MATERIAL PAYMENI' 
BONDS. 
"'he law in Utah with resoect to tlie issue involved in this case was 
''.;t stated in the case of Salt Lake Citv v. O'Conner, et. al., 249 P.810 
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(Utah, 1926). In O'Conner, this court stated that a suretv is not entitle<] 
to have payments ma<le by the contractor to a materialman from oroceerls of !xin~'­
received on account of the contract, aoplie-i on a particular inoebte<iness f,Jr 
which the surety is liable. In O'Conner it was oroved that the contractor 
had pain to the materialman certain sums from funds derived frcrn the procee<ls of 
the bonds oaid and delivered to the contractor on account of tl-ie rontract in 
question, and that the 9ayments received by the materialman were ap0lied uoon 
pre-existing debts arising out of a prior and indeoendant transaction not 
secured by the bond involved in the action. 'l'he surety argued that it 1-iad an 
equity interest in the payment of funds on its bond obligation and that 
it had a right to have a specific application of those funds to the debt for 
which the surety was liable. 'l'he Court re1ected the argument and allowed 
judgment to the plaintiff materialman against the bond. 
In a later case, Utah State Builoi_ng Canmission v. (;reat .1\merican 
Indemnity canpany, 140 P.2D 763 (Utah, 1943), the Utah State Builning 
Comnission brought an action for the benefit of Mountain States Sunolv r::anoanv 
against Frank Campion and a sub-contractor and the suretv, Great American 
Indemnity Canpany. Camoion was the general contractor on the TJtah State 
Tuberculosis SanitorillrT\ at Ogden, and furnished a bond issued bv the Great 
American Indemnity Canpany conditioned to pay for all materials going into ·~e 
sanitorium. 'l'he defendant Sargeant was a plumbing sub-contractor and orclered 
materials frcrn Mountain States Supply C_ompany. During the course of 
construction, Campion paid Sargeant, the sub-contractor, in full on Sargeant's 
contract. Sargeant had a general account with "buntain States Supplv ccmoanv 
and purchased materials for other jobs on said account. Sargeant would desiqn;t' 
certain payments to be applied onlv to the sanitorillrTl job, but .....::iulo also make 
-4- j 
, 3 lllf_,,,_, ,,.,i thout a designation, whidl payments were credited to his general 
rrc,t, ITt ts interesting to note at this point that the facts of Great 
_-'1"''-'- 1•,;Jn T_r!:~ are on all fours with the facts of this case. That 
ren 'J0noo Construction made designations on its checks as to the application 
c'rrrSP fCJnds, they were so applied, but when no such direction was included on 
tee r:hPr:k, tl-ie check was applied on the general acoount.) 
~he surety, Great American Indemnity, took the position as the surety in 
>_c,e CJ'Conner case, that it had an equity interest in funds paid on the 
=tract and that it was entitled to be credited for all funds generated on the 
'Dntract and Paid to suooliers and materia1man. The oourt rejected the 
aqument and made the following statements in its decision: 
We are convinced that the better reasons, as well as the pre-
oonderance of 1udicial ooinion support the oonclusions reached 
by the trial court. 1'hat is, that the mater ialman was at liberty 
to aoply the rroney to the old debt •.. 
It is elementary law that: a creditor may apply a payment 
•mluntar il v made by a debtor, without any specific appropriation 
where there are two or more debts, to whichever debt he pleases .•• 
In view of the definite findings of the trial oourt that there was 
no direction as to how the payment in question should be applied, 
and that the supply a:rnpany did not know the source of t-'1e money, 
Campion and his surety have no right to a:rnpel its application to 
the sanitorium account. 
In the case of Standard Oil CCTnpany vs. Day, et. al., 161 Minn. 281, 
201 'l.W. 410, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held, in a case with facts very 
similar to the previously cited cases and this case that, even though the 
~aterialman knew that the monev it received came from the original oontractor, 
·" '.Dl1ld, pursuant to an understanding between the materialman and the sub-
nitractor, a~lv the money to the extinguishment of a Prior unsecured debt on 
'·re ·irnund that the monies so unconditionally paid to the sub-oontractor became 
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its rroney, to use as its own, and that the suretv hacl no equitv in the mone,1 a~; 
no right to direct the apolications of pavments. 
In the case of ':Javis Countv Soard of Education v. Underwood, 14g 
P.2d 722, the Utah Supreme Court uoheld a jurv clecision awarding -judgment 111 
favor of the plaintiff, a material supolier, against a oontractor and a suret'I 
for value of material furnished by the plaintiff in the oonstruction of a 
school wherein the surety oontended that it was entitled to an offset of the 
amount that the oontractor had paid the material supplier and that the SuPDlio'. 
had applied upon a personal loan, rather than upon the material a=unt. 
Under Utah law, based upon the facts of this case, if the r:ourt adopts 
the affidavit of Geneva Pipe Crnu:>any, it would be entitled to 1udqment as ora'10 
in its o:rnplaint, as a matter of Law. That is, ,..,eneva Pipe Ccmpanv, throuqh '.:' 
affidavit, states that it did not receive anv 1<ind of direction frc:rn Jonco 
Construction Ccrnpany as to the aoplication of the $45,000.00 of $7 ,500.00 chec'(' 
received in June and lllovember, 1981, respectivelv. The practice of r,eneva PiS€ 
Companv was, and had been, to apply funds received in payment for iohs where t.' 
job was either designated or the invoice was designated, or to apply f'Jnds 
received without designation to the general a=unt of Jonoo Construction 
Company. Such was the practice in the cases herein cited, and this r_ourt uohel~ 
rulings of the trial oourt or jurv awarding 1udgment to the olaintiffs. 'T'hus, 
based upon the affidavit of Geneva Pipe Ccmpanv and the facts of this case, 
Geneva Pil)e Company is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under the 
Minnesota case, Geneva Pipe Comoany is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
regardless of whether it knew the source of the monies oaid to it or had been 





TI-JE PHJVISIONS OF SB2TION 58A-l-19 l1rA8 CDDE ANN:f!'ATED 
1'153 A.S AMENDED, PREIJ10USLY 58-23-14.S urAH CDDE ANIDI'A'J'ED 
rn 'UT' l-!AVE APPLIC'..ATION 'I1'.) IBIS CASE. 
"'his 0-::0urt ·'lecided the case of Western Ready Mix Concrete eanpany v. 
':_crlri•]uez, <;67 !'.2d 1118 (Utah, 1977), whidl case cites section <;8-23-14.S Utah 
:o:Je l\nnotated, now SBA-1-19, Utah Code Annotated. The statute as ronstrued by 
t'1is court is rlistinguishabl"! an<l is not available to S & H Insurance Conoany as 
3 ief1>nse to the claims of Geneva Pipe Canoany. 
Section 58A-l-19, Utah Code Annotated, states the following: 
Any CMner or rontractor in making any pavment to a materialman, 
cnntractor, or subrontractor with whan he has a running acrount, 
"r with whom he has more than one rontract, or to whan he is 
otherwise indebted, shall designate the rontract under which the 
payment is rnade or the items of account to whidl it is to be applied. 
''i'hen a payment for materials or labor is made to a sub-rontr actor, 
or materialman, sud! sub-contractor or matedaL'l\an shall demand 
of the tierson making such payment, a designation of the account 
3fld the items of acrounts to which the payment is to apply. In 
any case where a lien is claimed for materials furnished or 
labor performed by a sub-rontractor or materialman, it shall be a 
defense to the claim that a payment made, bv the owner to the 
cnntractor for the materials has been so designated, and paid 
over to the sub-contractor or materialman, and that when the 
oayment was received by the sub-contractor or materialman, he 
did not ·iemand a designation of the acrount, and of the items of 
acrount to whidl the payment was to be applied. (Emphasis added) 
In the C'lse of Western Ready Mix above cited, a Mr. Kelly engaged a 
'·Ir. Rodriguez as a rontractor to make repairs to his hane, in an amount in excess 
Jf $500.00, but dirl not require that a bond be furnished pursuant to Section 
:4-~-l, Utah Code Annotated. Thus, Mr. Kelly became personally liable to 
lol~,ialman for sup:ilies furnished pursuant to the rontract. Mr. ~elly paid "tr. 
0 '>'1r qu<>z 3flrl Mr. Rodriguiz paid Western Ready Mix Concrete for materials 
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supplied, however, Western Ready Mix Concrete credite<l the oavment to a 'lebt 
owing bv Mr. Rodriguez for canent used on another job. l•lestern Readv 'lix 
thereafter sued Mr. Rodriguez and Mr. Kell v for pavment of the concrete -oupol E 
to Mr. Kelly's heme. The SlJl)reme Court ~enied the claim of Western Reacv 'lix 
Concrete stating the following: 
'tlhen a rontractor has an acrount with a materialman, which 
includes material furnished to jobs other than that of an owner 
who pays the rontractor, the statute requires the materialman 
to make inquiry as to the job to be credited for any money oaid 
by the contractor. And unless he does so, he loses his right 
to claim a serond payment fran the owner if he credits the 
money to sane other person's acrount. 
The statute set out above was enacted to prevent the very 
thing that is involved in the instant case. 1t is a defense 
against the provisions of the old law (Section 14-2-1, Utah 
Ccxle Annotated) and prevents a miscarriage of justice. 
("Emphasis a:ldedl 
It should be noted that the Utah Supreme Court made direct reference hv 
footnote to Section 14-2 in its holding that the provisions of Section SBA-1-19 
ronstituted a "defense against the provisions of the old law." 'l'hat is, the 
Supreme Court has held that an owner of orooertv who fails to obtain a 
oerformance bond fran a cnntractor as required by Section 14-2-1, can claim a 
defense under Section 58A-l-19. The Supreme ("_ourt did not a00ly the rxovisions 
of Section 58A-l-19 to Section 63-56-38, Utah Ccxle Annotated, which is t~e 
Section under which the bonds of S & H Insurance canoanv in this case were 
required to be obtained. 
Produced hereafter are the o::mplete provisions of Section 63-56-38, Uta!, 
Ccxle Annotated, the statute under which the defendant c; & 1'1 Insurance eropany 
was required to give bonds in this present case. This is done so that SC!1l€ 
important differentiations can be noted and distinguishing characteristics 
-R--
v1r1tet-l 'JUt. 
30rrJs necessary when contract is awarded. (1) When a construction 
:nntr"lct is awarded, the follCMing bonrls of seruritv shall be ae-
l 11ered to the state and shall bea::me binding on the oarties uoon 
''1e exerution of the contract: c 
(a) A performance bond satisfactory to the state, in an 
,'lJT'()unt ~al to 100% of the price specified in the contract, 
oxecuted by a surety company authorized to do business in this 
c;tate or any other form satisfactory to the state; and 
(b) A payment bond satisfactory to the state, in an 
arrount ~al to 100% of the price specified in the contract, 
executerl by a surety o:mpany authorized to do business in this 
state or any other form satisfactory to the state, for the oro-
tection of all persons supplying labor and material to the Con-
tractor or its subcontractors for the performance of the work 
provider] for in the contract. 
(2) Rules and regulations may provide for waiver of the 
requirement of a performance or payment bond where a bond is 
ieemed unnecessary for the protection of the state. 
(3) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the 
contractor or subcontractor for the work proviaed in the con-
tract, in reSPect of whic:h a payment bond is furnished under 
this section, who has not been paid in full within 90 davs 
from the date on whic:h the last of the labor was oerformed or 
material was suoplied by the person for whorn the claim is made, 
shall have the right to sue on the oayment bond for any aJTOunt 
unpaid at the time the suit is instituted and to orosecute the 
action for the aJTOunt due the person. HCMever, any person having 
a mntrart with a subcontractor of the contractor, but no exoress 
or implied contract with the contractor furnishing the oayment 
tond, shall have a right of action IJlX)n the oayment bond uoon 
giving written notice to the contractor within 90 days Eran 
the date on which the last of the labor was performed or material 
was suoplied by the person for whan the claim is made. The 
person shall state in the notice the aJTOunt claimed and the name 
of the party for whan the labor was performed or to whorn the 
material was supplied. The notice shall be served personallv 
or by registered or··certified mail, postage 9repaid, in an 
en?elooe adaressed to the contractor at any place the contractor 
maintains an offio= or conducts business. 
(4) Any suit instituted upon a payment bond shall be brought in 
the district court of the county in whic:h the construction con-
'ract was to be performed, but no suit shall be a:rrrnenced later 
than one year frorn the aate on which the last of the labor was 
performed or material was suoolied by the person bringing the 
suit. The obligee named in the bond need not be ioined as a 
oartv in the suit. 
1t is interesting to note that subparagraph (3) of Section 63-56-38, 
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Utah Code Annotated authorizes a direct action against tl-ie oavment bond wherp, 
=npany furnishes the same. ~owhere in Section 61-56-18, 'Jtah <:ode 11.nnotacoc 
is there any reference to any clefenses available to tl-ie oerson furnishinu " 
that are similar to the provisions of 'i8A-l-19, Utah Code Annotated. 'l'he onl: 
limitations imposed bv Section 63-56-38 are those with resoect to anv perSDn 
having a o:mtract with the suboontr'lctor with no orivitv of oontract wit'1 the 
original oontractor and also the limitation of time in which a lawsuit must cl' 
filed. 
It is further interesting to note that in the case of a governmental 
entity, a person supplying materials cannot file a mechanic's lien on the 
property (38-1-1, Utah Code Annotated), and all government oonstruction mntract 
must 'Je bonded with few exceptions as set forth in Section 63-56-38. On L'ie 
other 1-iand, private oonstruction oontracts are subject to the mechanic's lien 
laws set forth in Section 38-1 et. seq., TJtah Code Annotated, and do not 'lave'·-"' 
requirement of a bond. These distinquishing features are significant 
particularly when reference is made to the language of Section 58A-l-l'l, Utah 
Code Annotated. 'l'he language of the statute restricts the nefense set forth 
therein to "any case where a lien is claimed for materials furnished or lator 
performed by a suboontractor or materialman ... ". Since it is impossible 'or a 
materialman or suboontractor to place a lien upon orooertv involving a 
governmental oonstruction oontract or "<::>ublic" oontract as stated in Section 
38-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, the defense whidl can be asserted against a lien 
claimant under the provisions of 58A-l-19 does not apply against a claim of a 
materialman or suboontractor furnishing materials or lal:or to a bonded oublic 
oonstruction project. It would seem to be oonsistent with princioles of F' 1' 
play that since a supplier, mater ialman or suboontr actor cannot file a l ieo 
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, 1 , nn;truction pro1ect and that all sum projects are required to be bonded 
. , , 'ie 'lrc:itection of the owner that the claimant ought to be able to proceed 
1 • '0•i' l '1 aqa inst the bonding o:mpany without the defenses against his claim as 
,,,rtl, in Sect ion SBA-1-19, Utah Code Annotated. 
"'inall'f, this Court in its interpretation of Section SBA-1-19, Utah Code 
:1J1c•t1terl, in the Western Ready Mix case nealt wit.'1 a set of facts where 
H',ere was no tond and where the owner was the subject of personal liability to 
c~e materialman or suboontractor. Obviously the decision of the Court was to 
interpret the statute as it should be interpreted as a protection for the owner 
md not for a bonding o:mpany. Interestingly enough, Section 58a-l-19 makes no 
•eferenoe to any protection for a bonding o:mpany but li~its the protection to 
>~e cMner who beo:::rnes personally liable to suboontractors and oontractors for 
mnstruction Projects on his property if he fails to obtain a performance or 
Jayment bond. Thus, the provisions of 58A-l-l9, Utah Code Annotated ao not 
1ffor'1 a shiela of protection for the defendant S & H Insurance C',anpanv to hide 
':ienind, because S & H Insurance Canpany does not take the position o!' the owner 
Ln a oublic oonstruction oontract but is an insurer of faithful performance ana 
oavment of the obligations of the oontract. To allow the nefenaant S & 1'l 
:nsuranoe Canpany to claim protection under Section 58A-l-19, Utah Code 
'.crntated, in a situation involving a public oonstruction project where a bond 
<as required and where the plaintiff oould not file a lien on the project 
orooertv, •,,Qul<i be an unwarranted and overly broad interpretation of both the 
otatutp ;md the western Ready Mix decision of this Court. The protection of 
·dA-1-19 is a protection for an owner in a pr iv ate oonstruction project whereby 
• 
1 dvertanoe he may have faile<l to obtain a bond and became personally liable. 
''lch is the onlv interpretation whim has been given to the statute by this Court 
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in Western Ready Mix. To apolv the provisions of Section 58A-l-l9 to the 
fact situation before this Court in this case would be to imoose a 4irect 
oontradiction u1JOn the provisions of Section 63-56-38, !Jtah Cooe Annot 3 t....,l, 
specifically allows and authorizes a law suit directly against the tonding 
a::mpany in situations where a suboontractor or a material.man have not IYeen oaid 
by the oontractor. 
Thus, plaintiff oontends that the provisions of Section 58A-l-19 do not 
provide a defense to a surety who is required to give a bond under Section 
63-56-38, Utah Code Annotated, and that the defense provided under Section 
58A-l-15, is available only to an owner who fails to obtain a bond under Section 
14-2-1, whidl is the only oonclusion this oourt reached in the Western Readv 
Mix case. 
ronrr III 
SUMMARY Jt.JOCMENI' OOES ID1' LIB UNLESS 'IBERE IS "D GENUINE 
ISSUE AS 'TD N'N MATERIAL FACT AND 'ffiE MJVnx; PARI'Y IS 
EITT'ITLED 'ID JUCGMEITT' AS A MA'ITER OF LAW. 
Rule 56 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a slll1U11ar·1 
judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, deoositions, and answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, toget'ier with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that t~e 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." This l-ias heen 
judiciallv interpreted by this Court to mean a "summary -judgment is not a 
substitute for trial but is rather a judicial search for determining w\-iether 
genuine issues exist as to material facts. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, dictates the granting of surrmary judgment where there is no genuine 
issue of a material fact." Leininger v. Steams - Roger Manufacturing_ 




Tn effect, summary judgment is a judicial to:>l use<l to pare a disoute 
, ,,,,, 1.0 -,mere> ')nl'! the actual controversy exists. Its ouroose "is to eliminate 
,~ , '""', '= roubl,o and expense of trial when up::in any view taken of the facts as 
,,,,, 
0
" iY/ the riarty ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail. 0nly 
,,,,,,c, i >. so apoears, is the Court justified in refusing such a partv the 
~')01r'.:1nit·f 0f presenting his evidence and attempting to persuade the fact tri.er 
:c ni~ ·1iews. Conversely, if there is any dispute as to any issue, materi.al to 
'~e settlement of the controversy, the sUITanary judgment should not be granted." 
~')l~rook CanPany v. Adams, P.2d 191, 193 (Utah, 1975). 
POINI' IV 
A GENUmE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT WAS RAISED BY 'ffiE PLEADrn3S 
AND AFFIDAVITS • 
. l\s oreviousl•t set forth in this brief, the law in Utah is such that a 
:::re--Jitor may apply a payment voluntarily made by a debtor without any soecific 
3ooropriation, where there are two or more debts, to whichever debt he 
?·eases ... ". Utah State Building Catrnission vs. Great American Indemnitv 
':o., 105 Utah 11, 140 P.2d 763 (1943). 
In this case, .Jonco Construction Ccrnpany made payments to Geneva Pipe 
'.:anoany for materials furnished. Jonco Construction Ccrnpany had an ooen account 
<i:c ';eneva Pioe Ccrnpany. The pavments were sanetirnes 11irected to particular 
jOcs or invoices .and other times no designation was made. The o:::mtroversy 
;urrnunds t'"'8 payments that were not so designated, and a=rding to long 
3'.onding practice the payments were applied to the general a=unt. Geneva Pipe 
mranv dai.ms that no subsequent designation was o:mnunicated by .Jonco 
1·nstruction Canpany. .Jonco Construction Ccrnpany claims that o:mnunication was 
"''1" Jn ho,, to apply the funds. The issue of whether or not the $45,000.00 and 
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$7 ,500 .00 ?ayments were directefl to be aPPl ie<l on tfie ~nt icell_o jof:l is '1~":'/ 
critical and vital to the determination of this case -mrl said issue ·-ias not 
resolved by the pleadings or affidavits in the case. Plaintiff cnntPnrls r00 , 
Summary Judgment was improper. 
mNCLUSION 
This Court in the case of Utah State Buil/ling r:rnrnission vs. Great 
American Indemnity Co. decided the case with the facts identical to the facto 
of this case -md held in favor of the plaintiff allo.ving the plaintiff to 
rollect against the surety Great American Indemnity. Were this Court to follCJ• 
the ruling in the Utah State Building Ccmnission case, then Plaintiff would 
be entitled to judgment as prayed in its o:xnplaint. 
'1'he case of Western Readv '"lix Concrete C'..o. vs. Rodriquez is 
distinguishable from the case of Utah State Builrling Ccmnission •1s. Great 
American Indemnitv Co. both on the facts and the law. '.\lestem Reariy "lix 
involved a case of a mechanic's lien foreclosure under the mechanic's 1 ien law 
on a private construction project. This case involves a law suit tfiat by 
specific authority of Section 63-56-38, TJtah Code Annotatefl, against the 
defendant surety on a public ronstruction project. It is olaintiff' s oontenti0~ 
that the ruling in Western Ready ~ix does not have application to the facts 
of this case. 
The trial rourt wrongfully entered Surrunary ,Judgment against t 11e 
plaintiff by failing to reoognize an issue of material fact raised by the 
pleadings and the affidavits in the file. The trial court also improperly 
ronstrued and interpreted the western Readv ~ix case. Thus, olaintiff 
ccntends that this C'..ourt should reverse the ruling of the trial court and Pnte 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff as prayefl in its o:xnplaint or in thl' 
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', 1~ rhi.s ·-::ourt shoula reverse the <iecision of the trial oourt an<i reman<i 
c·x trial of the issues of the case. 
. --/L 
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